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 Abstract 
Although the commentaries on our target paper (De Houwer, Hughes, & Barnes-
Holmes, 2017) reveal general agreement about the fact that interactions between functional 
and cognitive researchers are possible, there is disagreement about (1) whether such 
interactions can be beneficial, (2) the optimal way of interacting, and (3) the maximal extent 
to which interactions can be beneficial. By discussing these three points of disagreement, we 
hope to further clarify the position that we put forward in the target paper and to eliminate 
some of the misunderstandings that sustain the divide between functional and cognitive 
psychology. 
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Bridging the Divide Between Functional and Cognitive Psychology 
 In the current academic climate, there are few incentives for reflecting on meta-
theoretical issues. We therefore greatly appreciate the fact that several colleagues took the 
time to read and comment on our target paper (De Houwer, Hughes, & Barnes-Holmes, 
2017) in which we focused on one of those issues: the relation between functional and 
cognitive psychology within the context of applied research. The commentaries complement 
the target paper by providing additional support for the arguments that we put forward (e.g., 
Hambrick, 2017; Mickes, 2017; Smith, 2017) but also by raising possible counterarguments 
(e.g., Goldsmith, 2017; MacLeod & Risko, 2017; Markman, 2017; Proctor & Xiong, 2017; 
Wills & Hollins, 2017). We are happy to see broad consensus about the idea that 
communication between functional and cognitive researchers is possible. There was less 
agreement, however, about (1) whether communication between functional and cognitive 
researchers can produce benefits, (2) the type of communication that would be most 
beneficial, and (3) the maximal extent to which communication could be beneficial. In the 
remainder of this paper, we address each of these points of disagreement.  
Should Functional and Cognitive Researchers Communicate? 
 Proctor and Xiong (2017) argue that functional and cognitive researchers cannot 
interact in mutually beneficial ways because their approaches are fundamentally different 
(also see MacLeod & Risko, 2017). Although we agree with their premise, we do not 
subscribe to their conclusion. We believe that scientists, just like people in general, can 
benefit from diversity. It is true that different worldviews lead to differences in scientific 
aims and differences in the actions that researchers undertake to reach those aims. However, 
actions that are directed at one set of aims can often be put to use in the pursuit of other aims, 
especially when different sets of aims are interrelated (as is the case with the aims of 
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functional and cognitive psychology). Hence, functional research has the potential to 
facilitate cognitive research and vice versa. 
 The fact that Proctor and Xiong (2017) resist this conclusion seems to be grounded in 
a continuing belief that functional and cognitive psychology are scientific rivals that can only 
compete. More specifically, they argue that both approaches share the aim of predicting 
behavior and thus compete in trying to achieve this aim. However, even an overlap in aims 
does not preclude fruitful collaboration between functional and cognitive researchers.1 At 
least in principle, it is possible to learn from how (scientific) rivals operate. Denying this 
possibility on an a priori basis results in a monolithic scientific landscape that is viable only 
to those who believe that there is one objectively best way of uncovering one objective truth. 
Rather than adopting such a monolithic model of psychological science, we prefer to explore 
ways in which functional and cognitive researchers can interact to their mutual benefit.  
What is the Best Way of Communicating? 
 In the target paper, we argued that applied psychology can benefit from analyzing 
phenomena in terms of general functional principles such as reinforcement and stimulus 
control (De Houwer et al., 2017). Most importantly, it allows functional and cognitive 
researchers to communicate about research in a way that is both abstract (thus avoiding the 
problems of effect-centric research) and agnostic with regard to the mental processes that 
mediate the effect (thus avoiding the problem of proxies and maximizing theoretical 
freedom). Wills and Hollins (2017), on the other hand, argue that communication in terms of 
general functional principles might reintroduce the problem of proxies and orientate attention 
away from the unique features of the specific issue that applied researchers seek to address 
                                                          
1 Note that Proctor and Xiong (2017) do not take into account the fact that functional and cognitive researchers 
have different reasons to aim for prediction. For functional researchers, prediction cannot be seen independently 
from the goal to influence behavior. For cognitive researchers, prediction serves as a touchstone for the 
evaluation of theories about mental mechanisms (Hayes & Brownstein, 1986). 
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(e.g., improve the quality of eye witness testimonies). Instead, they proposed that applied 
psychology should focus on observations and engage in effect-centric research that sticks to 
the data. 
We agree that abstraction should not be a priority for applied psychology but believe 
that abstractive analysis is vital for its success. Although both abstraction and abstractive 
analysis deal with the relation between knowledge about individual cases and knowledge 
about general principles, the flow of information differs. Whereas abstraction involves 
knowledge about specific cases that influences knowledge about general principles, 
abstractive analysis involves knowledge about general principles that is applied to specific 
cases. We agree with Wills and Hollins (2017) that abstraction could be detrimental for 
applied psychology by detracting attention away from the particularities of the specific issue 
that is being addressed. However, applied psychology can definitely benefit from abstractive 
analyses because it creates the possibility of generalizing knowledge about general principles 
(e.g., reinforcement) to specific cases (e.g., tantrums in children). The functional analytic-
abstractive level of explanation offers an important repertoire of general principles that can 
be used for this type of abstractive analysis. Hence, we believe it is helpful for applied 
researchers to communicate in terms of general functional principles.  
Doing so does not reintroduce the problem of proxies. In essence, general functional 
principles are categories of individual effects that share certain functional properties (e.g., all 
instances of reinforcement involve an increase in response frequency as the result of 
outcomes that follow the responses). Hence, it makes little sense to say that an individual 
effect is a proxy of a general principle; it is merely an instance of a general principle. Of 
course, the claim that a specific effect is an instance of a particular functional principle could 
turn out to be incorrect. However, because general functional principles refer only to the 
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environment and behavior rather than to non-physical mental mechanisms, it is much easier 
to verify whether a specific effect is an instance of particular functional principle than it is to 
verify whether an effect is mediated by a particular mental mechanism. 
Although we continue to defend the usefulness of communication in terms of general 
functional principles, we certainly do not want to restrict all scientific communication to this 
level. Of course it can be useful to communicate in terms of specific observations or 
topographical descriptions of effects, especially as a starting point. Contrary to what Proctor 
and Xiong (2017) seem to suggest, we also do not want to abolish communication at the 
mental level. It is self-evident that cognitive researchers must speak about mental 
mechanisms when operating at that level. Our main point is that communication in terms of 
general functional principles offers unique benefits to both functional and cognitive 
researchers and therefore would be ideal to optimize the outcome of their interactions. This 
implies that we are advocating multilingualism rather than a new type of unilingualism. 
Finally, Wills and Hollins (2017) argue that we struggle to give good examples of 
research that was inspired by both cognitive theories and general functional principles. We 
acknowledge that we provided too few concrete examples in our manuscript, in part because 
of restrictions in space but primarily because of our lack of knowledge of the applied 
psychology literature. We are therefore very happy that both Hambrick (2017) and Mickes 
(2017) give additional examples of how analyses in terms of general functional principles can 
facilitate cognitively inspired applied research. We are convinced that many more examples 
will emerge once communication between functional and cognitive researchers becomes 
more common. 
To What Extent Can Communication Between Functional and Cognitive Researchers 
be Mutually Beneficial? 
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Goldsmith (2017), Markman (2017), and MacLeod and Risko (2017) seem to agree 
that increased communication between functional and cognitive researchers in terms of 
general functional principles can provide benefits for applied psychology. However, they 
discuss two reasons for why cognitive researchers might benefit less from functional research 
than we suggested in our target paper. They argue that we (1) underestimate the power of 
cognitively-inspired applied research and (2) overestimate the power of the functional 
approach.  
Before we address these two concerns, we would like to point out that a debate about 
the merits of the functional-cognitive framework cannot be reduced to a debate about the 
relative merits of the functional and cognitive approaches themselves. Because they are 
fundamentally different, it should be clear from the start that one approach can never satisfy 
all the aims of the other approach. Hence, pointing at the strengths of one’s own approach 
relative to the other approach does not as such undermine the functional-cognitive 
framework. The functional-cognitive framework does not judge the power of the two 
approaches but aims to provide a meta-theoretical framework for optimizing the extent to 
which one approach can help achieve the aims of the other approach. Having said this, the 
maximal usefulness of the framework (i.e., the extent to which interactions with the other 
approach can be optimized) is bound by the limitations of the individual approaches. Hence, a 
discussion about the merits of the functional-cognitive framework should include a 
discussion about the merits of each separate approach. However, rather than treating these 
discussions as adversarial or obstacles for collaboration, we see them as opportunities to 
clarify the nature of both approaches and to eliminate any misunderstandings that could 
hamper collaboration. 
Let us start with the comment that we underestimated the power of the cognitive 
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approach. In hindsight, we understand why some colleagues arrived at this conclusion. 
Because of our aim to clarify how cognitive researchers can benefit from interacting with 
functional researchers, we probably put too much emphasis on widespread problems within 
cognitively-inspired research (i.e., the use of proxies and development of theories that apply 
to only one effect). We are therefore happy that the commentaries provide multiple examples 
of excellent cognitively-inspired research in which important applied issues (e.g., eyewitness 
testimony) were analyzed in terms of general cognitive mechanisms (e.g., metacognitive 
monitoring) without referring to proxies. Contrary to what Goldsmith (2017) seems to imply, 
however, this type of research does qualify as cognitively-inspired effect-centric research. As 
we noted in our target paper, the functional-cognitive framework entails that applied 
researchers can draw upon both cognitive theories and general functional principles as a 
source of inspiration. The research that Goldsmith refers to is clearly cognitively-inspired but 
remains effect-centric in the sense that it does not exploit general functional principles as a 
source for analyzing phenomena. The commentary of Goldsmith made us realize, however, 
that the term “effect-centric” is somewhat ambiguous in that it could also be understood as 
“lacking any type of abstractive analysis”, including an analysis in terms of general cognitive 
processes. This is not the meaning we had in mind, nor did we want to deny that cognitive 
theories can provide inspiration for highly abstractive analyses of specific effects in terms of 
general mental mechanisms.  
Nevertheless, we continue to believe that even the best cognitively-inspired research 
can benefit from considering general functional principles as an additional source of 
inspiration. Although it is impossible to argue at this point in time that general functional 
principles can provide inspiration for all aspects of all possible psychological phenomena, we 
do believe that cognitive researchers tend to underestimate the power of the functional 
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analytic-abstractive approach. Because of the historic divide between functional and 
cognitive psychology, few cognitive researchers are aware of the developments that took 
place in functional psychology within the last 40 or 50 years. This includes research on 
phenomena such as stimulus equivalence and arbitrarily applicable relational responding that 
provides an entirely new functional perspective on complex phenomena such as language and 
thinking (see Hayes, Barnes-Holmes, Zettle, & Biglan, 2016, for reviews, and Hughes, De 
Houwer, & Barnes-Holmes, 2016, for an introduction geared toward cognitive researchers). 
Just like it would be unimaginable to evaluate the merits of cognitive psychology based on 
the cognitive literature of 40 years ago, it does not make sense to dismiss the potential of 
functional psychology without knowledge of the recent literature. 
The historic divide between functional and cognitive psychology also sustains 
misunderstandings and misconceptions about functional psychology amongst cognitive 
researchers. For instance, in contrast to what MacLeod and Risko (2017) suggest, stimulus 
control as a functional principle (i.e., moderation of operant responses by discriminative 
stimuli) and bottom-up mental processes as a mechanistic concept (i.e., the lack of 
involvement of goal representations) are fundamentally different because they are situated at 
two different levels of explanation. It is of course possible to examine the relation between 
stimulus control and bottom-up processes by building a cognitive model of stimulus control. 
Interestingly, such a model would probably involve primarily top-down (i.e., goal-driven) 
processes in order to account for the operant nature of the responses (i.e., the fact that the 
responses are also a function of their outcome). Another common misunderstanding amongst 
cognitive psychologists is that internal phenomena such as conscious thoughts and feelings 
lie beyond the scope of functional psychology. As Goldsmith (2017) correctly points out, 
conscious thoughts and feelings can be treated as responses within a functional analysis. For 
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instance, one could explore whether internal phenomena such as conscious memories or 
meta-cognitive states can be reinforced or punished in a similar way as overt responses. 
Unlike Goldsmith, we do not see philosophical disputes about the causal status of internal 
states as an obstacle for using general functional principles as a source of inspiration for 
research on those internal states.2  In sum, we urge applied cognitive psychologists not to 
dismiss too quickly the added value that general functional principles can offer.  
In an age when science is becoming ever more interdisciplinary, it is striking to see so 
little communication between two of the most important approaches within the discipline of 
psychology. We continue to hope that our work will help bridge this divide.  
                                                          
2 When Skinner (1974) says that conscious internal states do not have a causal role in controlling external 
behavior, he uses the term “cause” in the sense of “ultimate” or “functional” cause. As physical beings, 
researchers cannot manipulate the internal states of people directly but only indirectly by intervening in the 
physical environment. In that sense, only elements of the physical environment are functional causes.  
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